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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 In this appeal, we consider whether a suspension with 
pay constitutes an “adverse employment action” under the 
substantive discrimination provision of Title VII. We hold 
that it typically does not. 
I 
 Michelle Jones was fired in 2011 by her employer, the 
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority 
(SEPTA). SEPTA says it dismissed Jones for submitting 
fraudulent timesheets; Jones says her termination was the 
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culmination of years of unlawful sexual harassment, gender 
discrimination, and retaliation. The District Court entered 
judgment for SEPTA, Jones v. SEPTA, 2014 WL 3887747 
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 2014), and Jones filed this appeal.  
 SEPTA is a public transit agency that serves 
Philadelphia and its environs. In 2001, Jones began working 
as an administrative assistant in SEPTA’s Revenue 
Operations Department under the supervision of Alfred 
Outlaw. On December 1, 2010, Outlaw suspended Jones with 
full pay after he discovered apparent fraud in her timesheets. 
Jones promptly informed SEPTA’s Equal Employment 
Opportunity (EEO) Office that she intended to file a 
complaint against Outlaw. At a meeting the following week, 
Jones told the EEO Office that he had “sexually harassed” 
and “retaliated against” her. App. 167. 
 In the meantime, Outlaw referred the timesheet matter 
to SEPTA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG). After an 
extensive investigation, OIG concluded in February 2011 that 
Jones collected pay for days she hadn’t worked by submitting 
fraudulent timesheets. SEPTA suspended Jones without pay 
on February 22, 2011 and formally terminated her in April of 
that year. 
 Jones continued to press her grievances throughout this 
process. In March 2011, she filed a complaint with the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission alleging that 
Outlaw had sexually harassed her and other female 
employees, ordered her to do personal work for him during 
business hours, and retaliated against her for resisting this 
mistreatment by accusing her of timesheet fraud. SEPTA 
therefore ended its internal investigation, but not before 
concluding that Outlaw had engaged in inappropriate 
behavior by once asking Jones to step on his back to relieve 
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spinal pain. This “lapse in judgment” was noted in Outlaw’s 
annual performance evaluation, and he was required to attend 
a training session regarding SEPTA’s sexual harassment 
policy. App. 1089–90. 
 Jones ultimately filed suit against SEPTA and Outlaw 
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania. Her amended complaint alleged gender 
discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Pennsylvania Human Rights 
Act (PHRA). She also alleged a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, common law 
wrongful termination, and retaliation in violation of the 
Family and Medical Leave Act. The District Court dismissed 
the wrongful termination claim and subsequently granted 
summary judgment to SEPTA and Outlaw on the remaining 
claims. Jones has appealed only the Court’s summary 
judgment on the Title VII, PHRA, and constitutional claims.  
II 
 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367. We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our review of a summary judgment is 
plenary. EEOC v. Allstate Ins. Co., 778 F.3d 444, 448 (3d Cir. 
2015). 
III 
 The linchpin of the District Court’s opinion was its 
holding that Jones’s claims fail principally because her initial 
suspension with pay was not an adverse action within the 
meaning of the employment discrimination laws. Jones, 2014 
WL 3887747, at *3–4, 6, 9. This is an issue of first 
impression in the Third Circuit. Although we need not 
consider and do not decide whether a paid suspension 
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constitutes an adverse action in the retaliation context, see 
infra Section IV-B, we hold that such a suspension generally 
does not constitute an adverse action in the substantive 
discrimination context.  
 Title VII forbids employers “to fail or refuse to hire or 
to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Our analysis of claims arising 
under this “substantive provision” is governed by the three-
step framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 
U.S. 792 (1973): first we ask whether the plaintiff has stated a 
prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation; if she has, 
we ask whether the employer has advanced a legitimate 
reason for its conduct; and finally we give the plaintiff an 
opportunity to prove that the employer’s proffered reason is 
pretextual. See Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
 A Title VII plaintiff must prove that she suffered an 
adverse employment action in order to satisfy step one of 
McDonnell Douglas. See Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 
F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003). We have described an adverse 
employment action “as an action by an employer that is 
serious and tangible enough to alter an employee’s 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment.” Storey v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 390 F.3d 760, 
764 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 The District Court held that Jones’s suspension with 
pay did not constitute an adverse employment action under 
Title VII. See Jones, 2014 WL 3887747, at *4. Although the 
District Court noted that we have “not addressed this issue,” it 
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also noted that other courts of appeals have unanimously 
concluded that “placing an employee on paid administrative 
leave where there is no presumption of termination” is not an 
adverse employment action under the substantive provision of 
Title VII. Id.; see Joseph v. Leavitt, 465 F.3d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 
2006) (“[A]dministrative leave with pay during the pendency 
of an investigation does not, without more, constitute an 
adverse employment action.”); Singletary v. Mo. Dep’t of 
Corr., 423 F.3d 886, 891–92 (8th Cir. 2005); Peltier v. United 
States, 388 F.3d 984, 988 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Von 
Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 869 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that “placing [an employee] on administrative leave 
with pay for a short time to allow investigation” is not an 
adverse action for retaliation purposes), abrogated on other 
grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 
U.S. 53, 60 (2006); Breaux v. City of Garland, 205 F.3d 150, 
158 (5th Cir. 2000) (placement on paid administrative leave is 
not an adverse action for purposes of a First Amendment 
retaliation claim). But cf. Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 
1078–79 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (placement on paid 
administrative leave can be an adverse action for purposes of 
a First Amendment retaliation claim). 
 Like the District Court, we think this chorus is on 
pitch. A paid suspension pending an investigation of an 
employee’s alleged wrongdoing does not fall under any of the 
forms of adverse action mentioned by Title VII’s substantive 
provision. That statute prohibits discrimination in hiring, 
firing, and “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment.” § 2000e-2(a)(1). A paid suspension is neither a 
refusal to hire nor a termination, and by design it does not 
change compensation. Nor does it effect a “serious and 
tangible” alteration of the “terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment,” Storey, 390 F.3d at 764, because “the terms 
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and conditions of employment ordinarily include the 
possibility that an employee will be subject to an employer’s 
disciplinary policies in appropriate circumstances,” Joseph, 
465 F.3d at 91. We therefore agree with our sister courts that 
a suspension with pay, “without more,” is not an adverse 
employment action under the substantive provision of Title 
VII. Id. 
 Applying this legal standard to the facts of this appeal, 
we readily agree with the District Court that Jones’s 
suspension with pay did not constitute an adverse 
employment action. In her brief, Jones summarily declares 
that her “indefinite suspension” that began on December 1, 
2010 was an adverse employment action without providing 
any argument for why this is so. Jones Br. 44. Having failed 
to marshal evidence that her suspension with pay was atypical 
in any way, Jones’s argument fails for the same reasons stated 
by our sister courts in the cases we have cited. Accordingly, 
we hold that Jones’s suspension with pay from December 1 to 
February 22 (when SEPTA suspended her without pay) was 
not an adverse employment action under the substantive 
provision of Title VII. 
IV 
 The fact that Jones’s initial suspension with pay was 
not an adverse employment action eviscerates much of 
Jones’s appeal but doesn’t doom it entirely. Therefore, we 
turn to her specific claims under Title VII, the PHRA, and the 
Constitution. Her statutory claims turn on whether summary 
judgment for SEPTA was appropriate on the Title VII claims. 
“[T]he PHRA is to be interpreted as identical to federal anti-
discrimination laws except where there is something 
specifically different in its language requiring that it be 
treated differently,” Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 
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561, 567 (3d Cir. 2002), and Jones identifies no relevant 
distinction here. Furthermore, Outlaw was a defendant on the 
PHRA counts of the complaint and not on the Title VII 
counts, and his liability as an “aide[r] and abett[or]” under the 
PHRA hinges on SEPTA’s liability. App. 1119 (Am. Compl. 
¶¶ 62, 66); see Dici v. Pennsylvania, 91 F.3d 542, 552 (3d 
Cir. 1996). Our main inquiry, then, is whether the District 
Court erred in granting summary judgment to SEPTA on 
Jones’s claims of gender discrimination and retaliation under 
Title VII. 
A 
1 
 To state a prima facie case of gender discrimination, 
the District Court said, Jones was required to “show that (1) 
she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for 
her position; (3) the particular disciplinary measure was an 
adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances of the 
disciplinary measure give rise to an inference of 
discrimination.” Jones, 2014 WL 3887747, at *3. We see no 
error in this formulation. See Geraci v. Moody-Tottrup, Int’l, 
Inc., 82 F.3d 578, 581 (3d Cir. 1996) (“The elements of [the] 
prima facie case . . . must not be applied woodenly, but must 
rather be tailored flexibly to fit the circumstances of each type 
of illegal discrimination.”). 
 To the extent that Jones’s discrimination claim is 
based upon her initial paid suspension, her claim fails for 
want of an adverse employment action for the reasons stated 
herein. See supra Part III. To the extent that her claim is 
based upon her subsequent suspension without pay and 
termination, however, we agree with the District Court that 
the chief defect of her claim lies in the final element of the 
prima facie case—the requirement of “some causal nexus” 
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between her gender and her adverse treatment by SEPTA. 
Sarullo, 352 F.3d at 798. The record is devoid of evidence 
supporting an inference that Jones’s suspension without pay 
and termination were products of discrimination instead of 
the natural result of SEPTA’s investigation into the 
allegations of timesheet fraud. 
 Jones’s briefs are “not a model of clarity,” SEPTA Br. 
34, but her main contention on this point seems to be that a 
reasonable jury could draw an inference of discrimination 
because SEPTA declined to punish male employees who 
engaged in the same alleged misconduct as she. See Filar v. 
Bd. of Educ., 526 F.3d 1054, 1061 (7th Cir. 2008) (“All 
things being equal, if an employer takes an action against one 
employee in a protected class but not another outside that 
class, one can infer discrimination.”). Jones points to 
evidence that at least one male SEPTA employee, John 
Solecki, was permitted by Outlaw to underreport his vacation 
time to compensate him for unpaid overtime work. But even 
if this practice was against SEPTA rules, it was materially 
different from Jones’s misconduct because Solecki did not 
fraudulently claim pay for work he never performed. Because 
of this distinction, the treatment of Solecki could not support 
an inference that Jones’s suspension without pay and 
termination were motivated by discrimination rather than by 
SEPTA’s good-faith conclusion that Jones submitted false 
timesheets. 
2 
 Jones also argues that she was the victim of a hostile 
work environment. In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 
the Supreme Court held “that a plaintiff may establish a 
violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on 
sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment.” 477 
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U.S. 57, 66 (1986). The Court went on to hold that workplace 
sexual harassment can be actionable under such a theory, so 
long as it is “sufficiently severe or pervasive.” Id. at 67. 
 In a pair of later cases, the Court elaborated on when 
an employer can be held vicariously liable under Title VII for 
harassment of an employee by her supervisor. Faragher v. 
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). Those decisions 
distinguished between “(1) harassment that ‘culminates in a 
tangible employment action,’ for which employers are strictly 
liable, and (2) harassment that takes place in the absence of a 
tangible employment action, to which employers may assert 
an affirmative defense.” Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 
129, 143 (2004) (citations omitted). This defense, which has 
come to be known as the Faragher–Ellerth defense, applies 
when the employer “exercised reasonable care to avoid 
harassment and to eliminate it when it might occur” and the 
complaining employee “failed to act with like reasonable care 
to take advantage of the employer’s safeguards and otherwise 
to prevent harm that could have been avoided.” Faragher, 
524 U.S. at 805. 
 Jones claims she has cited sufficient evidence of 
severe or pervasive sexual harassment by Outlaw. The 
District Court said this was irrelevant even if true, Jones, 
2014 WL 3887747, at *5 & n.3, and we agree. Even if Jones 
had evidence of severe or pervasive sexual harassment, 
SEPTA was entitled to the Faragher–Ellerth defense. 
 First, the defense is available to SEPTA because any 
sexual harassment of Jones by Outlaw did not “culminate[] in 
a tangible employment action.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808. 
The Supreme Court has defined a “tangible employment 
action” as “a significant change in employment status, such as 
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hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with 
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a 
significant change in benefits.” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761. 
Regardless of whether this term means precisely the same 
thing as “adverse employment action,” we think it clear that 
neither phrase applies to Jones’s initial paid suspension, 
which is the only action that Jones can link to the alleged 
harassment. As the District Court observed, SEPTA’s 
decisions to suspend Jones without pay and then terminate her 
were “based on the OIG investigation report, which itself 
relied on information independent from what was produced 
by Outlaw.” Jones, 2014 WL 3887747, at *6. 
 Second, SEPTA satisfies both prongs of the Faragher–
Ellerth defense on the merits. As the District Court noted, 
SEPTA took several steps in response to Jones’s allegations of 
harassment: it conducted an investigation, made findings, 
developed a “plan of action,” required Outlaw to attend a 
counseling session, and gave him a demerit on his evaluation. 
Id. at *7. Jones claims that this is not enough, but her 
arguments are unconvincing. Although it appears Outlaw never 
received training on SEPTA’s sexual harassment policy until 
after she complained, Jones identifies no authority showing 
that this precludes SEPTA from asserting the Faragher–
Ellerth defense. She also highlights Outlaw’s admission that he 
did not comply with SEPTA policy when he asked her to step 
on his back, but she doesn’t explain how this fact supports 
imposing vicarious liability on SEPTA. Jones further objects 
that Outlaw was given only a “slap on the wrist,” Jones Br. 26, 
but a showing that discipline was imposed is not required to 
prove that an employer’s remedial action was adequate, see 
Knabe v. Boury Corp., 114 F.3d 407, 413 (3d Cir. 1997). 
Indeed, a light punishment may have been suitable in view of 
SEPTA’s finding that Outlaw’s only proven misconduct was 
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the spine-stepping incident. Finally, Jones attacks SEPTA’s 
harassment policy for encouraging employees to report 
harassment to their supervisors, suggesting that the policy 
failed because her supervisor was Outlaw. But the policy states 
that an employee is expected to “[r]eport any incident 
immediately to his/her supervisor or to SEPTA’s EEO[ 
Office],” and any sensible employee would surely go the EEO 
route instead of complaining only to the very person 
committing the harassment. App. 703 (emphasis added). 
 That brings us to the second Faragher–Ellerth prong, 
which is even less favorable for Jones. Jones worked for 
Outlaw for about 10 years, and she asserts that she was 
subject to “pervasive” sexual harassment the entire time. 
Reply Br. 10. Despite 10 years of alleged harassment, she 
admits that she never made a complaint until Outlaw accused 
her of timesheet fraud, despite the fact that she knew that the 
EEO Office fielded such complaints—in fact, she had 
previously worked in SEPTA’s Office of Civil Rights, 
apparently the EEO Office’s predecessor. App. 145–46, 872; 
see SEPTA Br. 47–48. This demonstrates that Jones “failed to 
act with . . . reasonable care to take advantage of the 
employer’s safeguards and otherwise to prevent harm that 
could have been avoided.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805. Even if 
Jones could offer evidence of severe or pervasive sexual 
harassment by Outlaw, therefore, her hostile work 
environment claim fails because no reasonable jury could 
hold SEPTA liable for such harassment. Accordingly, we will 
affirm the District Court’s summary judgment on Jones’s 
statutory claims of gender discrimination. 
B 
 The other statutory claim at issue arises under the 
antiretaliation provision of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
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“A prima facie case of illegal retaliation requires a showing 
of (1) protected employee activity; (2) adverse action by the 
employer either after or contemporaneous with the 
employee’s protected activity; and (3) a causal connection 
between the employee’s protected activity and the employer’s 
adverse action.” Allstate, 778 F.3d at 449 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Jones posits that her suspension by Outlaw 
and her termination by SEPTA were retaliation against her 
informal complaints to Outlaw about his behavior and her 
formal complaint to the EEO Office. Outlaw’s suspension of 
Jones with pay was not actionable retaliation, however, 
because Jones has identified no evidence showing that her 
alleged informal complaints caused Outlaw to suspend her. 
Therefore, we must focus on whether a reasonable jury could 
conclude that SEPTA’s decisions to suspend Jones without 
pay and then terminate her were acts of retaliation. 
 Jones’s claim fails because there is no evidence that 
her complaints of harassment caused SEPTA to discharge her, 
and her efforts to establish a causal connection go nowhere. 
First, Jones claims that “she never falsified her timesheets” 
and suggests that this supports an inference that SEPTA’s 
actions were motivated by a desire for revenge rather than a 
bona fide belief that Jones had stolen wages. Jones Br. 51. 
The District Court found no evidence supporting Jones’s 
denial of wrongdoing, however, and also rightly noted that 
showing that an employer incorrectly found an employee 
guilty of misconduct is insufficient to prove retaliation 
anyway. See Jones, 2014 WL 3887747, at *10–11 & n.7; see 
also Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 766–67. 
 Jones also makes much of numerous alleged defects in 
OIG’s investigation of her timesheet submissions, arguing 
that these imperfections are evidence of bad faith and 
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“animosity” on SEPTA’s part. Jones Br. 47. She says, for 
example, that OIG interrogated her “by ambush” about the 
timesheet fraud; didn’t allow her to review the timesheets in 
question during that session; didn’t investigate whether 
someone besides Jones tampered with her timesheets; and 
didn’t look into whether any timesheet discrepancies were 
resolved by “adjustment forms” filed by Jones. Id. at 47–48, 
54. Each of these grievances is either unfounded or too petty 
to serve as evidence of retaliation, and the District Court did 
not err in treating them as such. See Jones, 2014 WL 
3887747, at *12–13. 
 Jones also argues that a reasonable jury could find 
retaliation here on a “cat’s paw” theory of liability. In Staub 
v. Proctor Hospital, the Supreme Court interpreted a federal 
statute prohibiting employment discrimination against 
members of the military to make employers liable when an 
employee’s “supervisor performs an act motivated by 
antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause 
an adverse employment action, and . . . is a proximate cause 
of the ultimate employment action.” 562 U.S. 411, 422 (2011) 
(footnote omitted). In McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, we 
approved the extension of this theory of liability to the Title 
VII context. 649 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 2011). Jones argues it 
applies here because, even if there is no direct evidence that 
SEPTA’s decision to terminate her was discriminatory, 
Outlaw’s accusation of timesheet fraud was driven by animus 
and contributed to Jones’s termination.  
 Even if Jones did produce evidence that Outlaw’s 
accusation was based on animus, her resort to the cat’s paw 
theory would still be unavailing. It may be true that Outlaw’s 
conduct was a but-for cause of Jones’s termination, as she 
may never have been fired for timesheet fraud had Outlaw not 
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reported the matter to OIG. But proximate cause is required in 
cat’s paw cases, and that requires “some direct relation 
between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged” 
and excludes links that are “remote, purely contingent, or 
indirect.” Staub, 562 U.S. at 419 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). The Staub Court declined to adopt a “hard-and-fast 
rule” that an employer’s intervening exercise of independent 
judgment (e.g., between the supervisor’s biased report of 
employee wrongdoing and the termination of the employee) 
precludes a finding of proximate cause. Id. at 420. But the 
Court did indicate that proximate cause will not exist when 
the employer does not rely on the “supervisor’s biased report” 
in taking the ultimate adverse action. Id. at 421 (noting that it 
“is necessary in any case of cat’s-paw liability” that “the 
independent investigation rel[y] on facts provided by the 
biased supervisor”). 
 Here, Jones offers no evidence that Outlaw influenced 
the OIG investigation or SEPTA’s termination decision 
beyond getting the ball rolling with his initial report of 
timesheet fraud. The only evidence Jones cites in support of 
her cat’s paw theory is that Outlaw conducted the initial 
investigation of Jones’s timesheets; OIG interviewed Outlaw 
and informed him of Jones’s harassment claims; and Outlaw 
communicated with OIG and the SEPTA official who 
determined Jones committed timesheet fraud. As the District 
Court acknowledged, though, the record also shows that 
SEPTA decided to terminate Jones “based on an investigation 
independent from Outlaw” that relied on forensic handwriting 
analysis (to determine if the signatures on Jones’s timesheets 
were phony) and “email, computer, and building access 
records.” Jones, 2014 WL 3887747, at *12. This case is a far 
cry from McKenna, where there was no evidence that the 
employer relied on anything besides the allegedly biased 
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supervisor’s say-so in deciding to terminate the employee. 
See 649 F.3d at 179. Here, undisputed evidence excludes the 
possibility that SEPTA merely “adopted [Outlaw’s] biased 
account of the events.” Id. For those reasons, we agree with 
the District Court that cat’s paw liability does not apply here. 
 In her only other attempt to conjure a causal 
connection between her complaints of sexual harassment and 
her termination, Jones notes that we have previously held that 
“temporal proximity between the protected activity and the 
termination is sufficient to establish a causal link.” Woodson 
v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920 (3d Cir. 1997). But 
Jones ignores other cases holding that “the timing of the 
alleged retaliatory action must be ‘unusually suggestive’ of 
retaliatory motive before a causal link will be inferred.” 
Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 503 (3d Cir. 
1997) (quoting Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 
1302 (3d Cir. 1997)). We reject Jones’s suggestion that a gap 
of nearly three months (between Jones’s harassment 
complaint and SEPTA’s determination that she committed 
timesheet fraud) raises a red flag, especially when SEPTA 
spent those three months on a thorough investigation into her 
alleged malfeasance. Because a reasonable jury could not find 
a causal link between her allegations of harassment and any 
adverse employment action, we will affirm the District 
Court’s summary judgment on the retaliation claims. 
C 
 Jones’s remaining claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
and allege violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
District Court held that Jones forfeited her constitutional 
claims by failing to mention them in her response to SEPTA 
and Outlaw’s motion for summary judgment. See Jones, 2014 
WL 3887747, at *14. Although Jones’s response did mention 
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those provisions (if only fleetingly, see Supp. App. 324, 335), 
we will nevertheless affirm the Court’s judgment on the 
constitutional claims. See Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 122 
n.1 (3d Cir. 2001) (“We may affirm a District Court’s 
judgment on grounds other than those considered by the 
District Court itself.”). First, Jones expressly waives her 
constitutional claims against SEPTA on appeal. Jones Br. 62 
n.4. Second, in support of her constitutional claims against 
Outlaw, she makes no affirmative argument that is 
distinguishable from her statutory arguments and provides no 
coherent reason why her evidence succeeds under § 1983 
even if it fails under Title VII. In the absence of such 
argument, we will not disturb the District Court’s summary 
judgment for SEPTA and Outlaw. See United States v. 
Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (“A 
skeletal ‘argument,’ really nothing more than an assertion, 
does not preserve a claim. Especially not when the brief 
presents a passel of other arguments . . . . Judges are not like 
pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.” (citation omitted)). 
* * * 
 For the reasons stated, we hold that Jones’s suspension 
with pay did not constitute an adverse employment action 
under the substantive provision of Title VII. And any adverse 
actions Jones did suffer were not sufficiently linked to any 
alleged misconduct to support a claim of discrimination or 
retaliation. Accordingly, the District Court did not err in 
entering summary judgment for SEPTA, and we will affirm 
that order. 
